THEOLOGY

VOL. LVIII MAY, 1955 No. 419

M.R.A. and Christian Sociology

THE Report of the Church Assembly's Social and Industrial Council on Moral Rearmament has been described by Dr Reinbold Niebuhr as "the most authentic and searching description and criticism of the movement which has been produced since its inception".[1] It is the more unfortunate therefore that, despite the length of time devoted to the subject by the Assembly at its February session, the report itself hardly received any serious discussion at all. How far this was due to what the Archbishop of York described as the "concerted pressure" from M.R.A. sources having operated to provoke a purely emotional reaction to the publication of the report, or how much it was owing to what (as some thought) were errors made by the Council in the preparation of the document, is perhaps arguable. But, for whatever reason, so much was heard from various disputants of the circumstances in which the report originated, of whether it ought to have been prepared or, if so, presented at all, and even of the suggestion that there is something inherently unchristian in making any criticisms whatsoever of M.R.A. in any circumstances, that hardly a single speaker made any serious effort to dicuss what the report did say or to examine what were the basic contentions on which its observations were founded.

I am in no way qualified to discuss the first two parts of the report in which M.R.A. and its claims are examined from the standpoint of theology and psychology. Dr Niebuhr (I think justifiably) describes the theological section as "superb", pointing out the significance of the fact that "it does not criticize the movement for straying from the niceties of Christian doctrine, but for failing to understand or emphasize parts of Christian truth which are necessary to understand the nature of man and of society, and the realities of the redemptive process which makes the renewal of life possible". Yet several speakers in the Assembly debate (as Dr Leslie Weatherhead has done since) actually made it a charge against the report that it should have founded its critique upon a theological basis. The Bishop of Sheffield, in the final (and I think the best) speech in the debate, dealt faithfully with this singular contention, and there is no need for me to say anything about it here. I shall confine my remarks to the theme of the third section of the report in which M.R.A. is examined from the standpoint of a Christian sociology. This section contains a few sentences which I should myself have preferred to have seen phrased somewhat differently, and there are certain considerations which could, in my view, have been added that would have reinforced its main arguments. But I signed the report with the greatest satisfaction that, as I felt, so cogent a critique

[1] *The Observer*, February 20, 1955.

was to be presented to the representative body of the Church of England. Yet scarcely a single one of those for whom time was found in the debate (and there were two dozen for whom, as we were told, it was not) paid the least attention to it.

As I see it, the fundamental point in this third section is that a moralistic approach to social problems is not an authentically Christian approach at all. Such an approach will not accept a social situation, a political policy or an economic enterprise as valid merely because those involved in them can be presumed to be "doing their best". That they should be doing so must obviously be something for which we shall have reason to be thankful, but it cannot of itself validate the situation, authenticate the policy, or justify the enterprise. What the Christian has to consider first in every such case is how far what is being attempted is directed towards something rational and worth-while, and secondly, how far the means by which the aim is sought are appropriate to it and to the nature of those engaged in its pursuit. Christian teaching cannot allow that moral qualities, however "absolutely" accepted and displayed, can be relied on to by-pass or rectify a social evil which arises from what has been ill-conceived or misunderstood. For example, the powerful organizations which devote so much energy to persuading the public to have what is oddly described as an "investment" each week on the upshot of a few dozen games of football may be—and no doubt are—directed by men absolutely honest in the conduct of them. These men may even be absolutely honest in believing that this is an admirable way of providing those who work for them with employment, and of engaging the activities and drawing upon the incomes of those whose stake money provides their funds. But a Christian judgment on these operations will not be determined by any estimate of the moral qualities of Messrs Littlewood, Sherman and their rivals in this enterprising field. It will have to be formed in relation to a doctrine of man and society which assesses the validity of the whole business in the light of its purposes, and of its effects on the life of those who habitually devote their time and resources to it, and on the character of a society of which this has become one of the most prominent features.

No doubt the pools do raise what are directly moral issues, both for the individual and for society. But there are many urgent social problems to-day which do not, yet it is not to be supposed that for this reason an informed Christian opinion can have no light to shed upon them. Nor does a social evil cease to be such because we cannot point to any particular individual or group of individuals and declare that it is their moral failure which is responsible for it. Yet the whole social outlook of M.R.A. depends upon the assumption that it is this, and only this, which the Church should be concerned to do. The report considerably understates the matter when it says (p. 41) that "M.R.A. makes insufficient appeal to reason". M.R.A. in fact virtually rules out serious sociological thinking as unnecessary. It takes no account of our duty to serve God with all our minds, which it is, not only because it is this primarily for which they have been given to us, but because in so far as we fail to do

this the service of our hearts will be impaired, and may even cease to be of any service at all. This is what the report is suggesting when it recurs again and again to the point that the M.R.A. approach involves political irresponsibility.

This approach is in fact suggestive of the cliché, once so popular at Rotary Club lunches, that all that is wanted in industry is "the right spirit". This smug truism does not even happen to be true, since the right spirit will only be valuable if that which it is relied upon to drive is pointed in the right direction. I may pour the right spirit into my car, but if when I start to drive it this vehicle is headed in the direction of a precipice or a bog, the quality of the spirit will not prevent my breaking my neck or getting hopelessly stuck. Religion is not primarily concerned with moral ideals or altruistic emotions, but rather with the quest for realization of the will of God and conscious dependence on his grace. And in the social sphere this involves not only a struggle with our own moral weakness, but still more perhaps an increasing effort to find what, in the context of our time, would be the pattern of a social order in which God's will could be done with the least hindrance, and an effort to make, *as part of our churchmanship*, our contribution towards an approximation to that.

If the task of the Church and the Christian is correctly stated thus, it clearly calls for far more than the demand for such a purely personal and moral dedication as, in the view of M.R.A., would suffice to extricate our civilization from its social and international difficulties. And this for three reasons at least. In the first place, no individual, however conscientious, can hope by himself to see all round the immense problems of our complex society, or even in many cases to perceive unaided what is his personal duty and opportunity in the particular situation in which he is placed. Secondly, man is by nature a social being and is by God's intention so related to his fellow men and to his environment that he will only become fully human in proportion as he seeks not primarily for an independent "salvation", but rather for the realization of social aims and relationships valid in themselves, to which he can attach his personal contribution. And thirdly, the Church is herself a society, and the Christian is not fully acting as such unless he is relating his efforts to the purpose and teaching of the "New Israel" which Christ came to re-establish and to which his promises are given. Little of any of these considerations—and least of all the last—seems to receive any clear recognition in the literature of M.R.A.

Implicit in the report of the Social and Industrial Council, and especially perhaps in its third section, are three basic criticisms. These are that while M.R.A. takes itself very seriously—indeed more so perhaps than any extempore movement of this sort ought to do, so that its critics are virtually stigmatized as enemies of Christ merely for being such[1]—it does not take Man seriously, it does not take

[1] This is certainly implied in the closing paragraphs of the "Comments" by the Council of Management on the report (p. 25).

"Some who are unaware of the world-wide spiritual battle now proceeding

Society seriously, and it does not take the Church seriously. It does not take Man seriously because it deals with his "moral rearmament" in isolation from the social factors which will necessarily condition and limit the efficacy of his individual effort. To assess man's spiritual significance on the basis of the effectiveness of his moral gestures is gravely to misunderstand his nature and destiny. Moreover, this exaggeration of the effect of his moral potentialities may offer a clue to the significant fact that Humility is not numbered among M.R.A.'s "absolutes", since by unnaturally abstracting the individual from his implication in the whole human predicament, it dangerously inflates the sufficiency of his ethical efforts. And that way Pelagianism lies.

This unbalanced emphasis on the individual involves M.R.A. in an outlook which does not take society seriously as the medium through which God has ordained that the divine purpose shall be sought and the divine will done. Here, alas! M.R.A. is only too representative of a trend which has been steadily gaining ground in Christian circles since William Temple has been no longer with us to expose and resist it. This is a disposition to assume that social righteousness is not in itself a valid goal of Christian striving, but merely a more or less likely by-product of a sufficiency of individual "conversions".

Finally, and very conspicuously, M.R.A. does not take the Church seriously. This is shown not only by its notable lack of emphasis on many of her basic doctrines and upon the means of grace mediated through her ministrations. It is shown again not only by its complete neglect of her traditional social teaching and of all contemporary explorations in this field. It is revealed yet more clearly by an obvious reluctance to recognize in the Church, however grave her failures at each moment of human history, the agent of God's Kingdom upon earth. That God will nevertheless accept and use for his purposes every disinterested effort and intention on the part of the many thousands whom this movement has contrived to influence is not to be doubted for a moment. But that the way to which it seeks to point us is the way he would have us follow, this report has given good reason to doubt, and those who examine it carefully will have no grounds any longer to believe.

MAURICE B. RECKITT.

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may miss the significance of this fact [that the Report has been interpreted as an attack by the Church of England on M.R.A.]. But those who are actively engaged in the battle for the wills of men will not only realize that hindrances must come, but also recall the words of Christ about those by whom they come. . . . What faith and philosophy is destined to shape the future by its power to win the hearts and souls of men? . . . Is it to be the victorious faith of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ? It is to his cause that the men and women who make up the world force of Moral Rearmament have committed their lives. Whether this report forwards that cause or not the impartial reader must decide."

The impartial reader may decide that seldom can any Christian movement have arrogated to itself by implication so presumptuous a claim.

Joshua Watson: 1771-1855

(An oration delivered at the Joshua Watson Centenary Commemoration Luncheon at the Hackney Free and Parochial Secondary School on Saturday, February 12, 1955: His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury being in the chair.)

THE concluding sentence of the Preface to the Prayer Book of 1662 contains an admirable reference to "all sober, peaceable, and truly conscientious Sons of the Church of *England*": and seldom have those Anglican qualities been more notably exemplified than in the character of him whom we commemorate to-day.

It was Charles Lloyd, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford,[1] who said of him: "I look upon Joshua as the best layman in England." And I cannot help but think that this panegyric which you have asked me to deliver should really be pronounced by a layman rather than by a parish priest. The argument for your asking me to do it is, I suppose, that the clergy and the laity are mutually complementary, and equally of the *bene esse*—or perhaps we should now say, of the *plene esse*—of the Church. As the Churchwarden of Owlby-cum-Scratby observed to the Vicar's son, who had just been ordained:

Well—sin ther beä chuch-wardens, ther mun be parsons an' all,
An' if t'one stick alongside t'uther the chuch weänt happen a fall:[2]

and that is a sentiment which may be readily endorsed. I do not think, however, that the subject of this centenary celebration was ever technically a churchwarden: although not even his self-effacing disposition could conceal the fact that few, if any, other laymen made so great, so lasting, or so ramified a contribution to the revival of the Church of England in the nineteenth century; and it was with considerable justice that the poet Wordsworth proposed that to the petition in the Litany there should be added after "all Bishops, Priests, and Deacons", the words, "*and also Joshua Watson*". Had he lived in our own Conciliar epoch, he would have found his niche as one of the most influential and least vocal members of the Church Assembly.

Watson was not only a Churchman, but a London Churchman, a Cockney born and bred, who first saw the light on Tower Hill on Ascension Day, May 9, 1771. He preferred, however, the rural seclusion of Clapton, where in 1811 he took a house within five minutes' walk of his brother's rectory at Hackney: and it was at Clapton that he died on January 30, 1855. But after his appointment as a Commissioner under the Church Building Act of 1818 for the building of new churches in populous districts, he took a residence in Westminster—first in Great George Street[3] in my own parish, and then

[1] Afterwards Bishop of Oxford (1827–9). Newman attended his Professorial lectures, and was influenced by them (*Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman*, ed. Anne Mozley, vol. i, pp. 109–13), and held his memory "in affection and veneration" (*Letter to Rev. Dr R. W. Jelf*).

[2] Tennyson, *The Church-Warden and the Curate* (1892).

[3] Where, in the winter of 1821 and 1822, he shared a house with Van Mildert, then Bishop of Llandaff (Churton, *Memoirs of Joshua Watson*, 2nd edtn, 1863, p. 130).

from 1823 to 1840 at No. 6, Park Street—in order to be near his work.

He was the son of a self-made man who, as a boy of sixteen, had walked from Cumberland to the metropolis to seek his fortune, and emerged as a successful wine-merchant and Government contractor with premises on Tower Hill, where his two sons were born. Joshua, who (after a somewhat sketchy education) had been taken into his father's counting-house at the age of fifteen, in due course inherited and enlarged the business. Then, in 1814, at the age of forty-three, having made as much money as he wanted, he retired from the City in order to place his abilities and his fortune at the service of the Church. The only man who ever sneered at him for this considerable sacrifice was his former friend, William Cobbett, a truculent and popular journalist—the John Gordon of the period—who characteristically, in his *Legacy to Parsons* (1835), went out of his way to make a gratuitous and ill-informed attack upon an inoffensive country clergyman in Leicestershire[1] who was a lineal ancestor of Your Grace. And here is Cobbett on Watson. In his *History of the Protestant Reformation* (1829), Cobbett wrote: "O Joshua, teacher of religion to the people of England . . . Oh, Joshua Watson! Alas! wine and spirit merchant who art head of a Society 'for promoting Christian knowledge' . . ." It is a sidelight upon Watson's character that he was sufficiently sensitive to be hurt, not by this, but by certain libellous statements of Cobbett's in regard to his brother's very modest ecclesiastical preferments. He drafted a reply, which after his death was found among his papers with the endorsement, "Never sent."[2]

After his retirement from business, for the remainder of his life —from 1814 to 1855—Joshua Watson devoted all his time and energies to the service of the Church of England. He never sought any public recognition for this, and in fact the only public honour that he ever received was an honorary doctorate conferred upon him in 1819, somewhat to his embarrassment, by the University of Oxford. But when we consider the range and the variety of his labours, we are amazed that any one man could have achieved so much. He never missed any meeting of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, or of the National Society.[3] In 1814 he became Treasurer of S.P.C.K., and his prudent administration and far-sighted statesmanship greatly increased its work and its resources. In the words of Dr Lowther Clarke, he was "the leading spirit in the Society at this period".[4] He increased the Society's annual income (which rose from £10,000 in 1800 to £92,000 in 1840); he also reorganized its strategy by persuading it, in 1825, to hand over its missionary work in India to S.P.G. The renewed vitality of the latter Society[5] and the rapid expansion of the Colonial Church were greatly due to his efforts:

[1] Letter VI (edtn 1872, p. 115). [2] Churton, p. 51.
[3] *D.N.B.*, art. "Joshua Watson", by Canon J. H. Overton.
[4] W. K. Lowther Clarke, *A Short History of S.P.C.K.* (1919), p. 42.
[5] Bishop Roberts (Secretary, S.P.G.) writes: "In an astonishing number of ways, Joshua Watson anticipated or instigated the developments of policy still characteristic of the Society. Not only did he strongly assert the principle of

and he was on terms of intimacy with almost all of the then few Colonial bishops, notably Middleton of Calcutta, Inglis of Nova Scotia, Broughton of Australia, and Selwyn of New Zealand, who found in him an invaluable mentor and a generous friend. When the new Missionary College of St Augustine, Canterbury, was founded in 1845, he was on the Council. From 1811 to 1842 he was Treasurer of "The National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church", which he and two of his friends had founded[1]: and in 1828 he took a leading part in the foundation of King's College, London, and was a member of its first Council. In 1817 he was largely instrumental in founding the Incorporated Church Building Society, and—what was a more delicate and more remarkable achievement—persuaded the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, to move Parliament to set up a Commission for Building and Promoting the Building of Additional Churches in Populous Places, and to vote £1,500,000 for this purpose. As we have already seen, Watson himself was one of the Commissioners, and of all his work this was probably the heaviest and the most exacting. But he had the sagacity to perceive that there was no use in putting up new plant without man-power to work it, and therefore in 1837 he helped to found, and drew up the constitution of, the Additional Curates Society, of which he became the first Treasurer: and this treasurership he retained later, I think, than any other, for he did not resign it until towards the end of his eighty-second year. Yet, of all the benevolent enterprises with which he was connected, the one which was perhaps the nearest to his heart was the Clergy Orphan School, of which he was Treasurer until 1828.

It is indeed difficult to think of any scheme of usefulness conducted on strictly Church principles of which he was not at some time Treasurer, or of any scheme, in which he could join without sacrificing any of those principles, with which he was not associated. But those words, "*conducted on strictly Church principles*", are very important: thus, for example, the foundation of King's College, London, was an antidote to the official godlessness of Gower Street, and the Additional Curates Society, pledged to work through the bishops,[2] was the High Church answer to the Church Pastoral Aid

episcopal responsibility, which their common founder, Dr Bray, had infused into the structure of S.P.C.K. and S.P.G.: his influence induced both Societies to extend their operations into the country, to depend less upon the proceeds of Royal Letters, and to establish that system of local organization and agents which has since borne such fruitful results. It has been pointed out that in 1814 the S.P.G. income for the year amounted to little more than £8,000, of which only £500 came from subscriptions and collections. By the date of his death in 1855 the figure had risen to £82,000, of which individual donations accounted for £51,000—a phenomenal increase of a hundredfold."

[1] It originated in a meeting at Watson's house at Clapton, consisting of three persons, Watson, Norris, and John Bowles.

[2] Similarly, writes Bishop Roberts, "he enunciated the principle that missionaries to be sent overseas should be commended by the authority of the Church at large rather than by a particular Society, which led to the examination of all S.P.G. candidates by a Board appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and by the Bishop of London".

Society founded by the Evangelicals in the preceding year. Yet, if Watson's churchmanship was strict,[1] his philanthropy was not narrow: he might feel profoundly uneasy about the employment of Lutheran missionaries in India by S.P.C.K., but in 1814 he had no scruple about organizing a national fund for the relief of Lutheran and Calvinist and Roman Catholic sufferers in a Germany devastated by the Napoleonic Wars.

All this is only a bare and summary outline of what was surely unique in the records of individual benevolence, and, even so, I have an uncomfortable feeling that I have probably left out something important. For fuller information I may be permitted to refer you not only to the official biography, *A Memoir of Joshua Watson* by Archdeacon Churton (1861: 2nd edtn in one volume, 1863), but even more to the Rev. Alan Webster's *Joshua Watson: the Story of a Layman*,[2] which is not only shorter and more readable, but also incorporates some new material and, in addition, sets the work of Joshua Watson in a truer historical perspective.

Between the year 1811—when Watson acquired a house at Clapton, assisted in the foundation of the National Society, and purchased the *British Critic* in order to restore it to its original role as the organ of the High Church Party—and the year 1841, when the Colonial Bishoprics Fund was established, largely on the initiative of the Bishop of London, Dr Blomfield—for those thirty years, most of the creative work in the Church of England was inspired and organized by Joshua Watson and his friends. What is even more remarkable is to observe how much of his work has stood the test of time, and how many of the Societies with which he was connected—S.P.C.K. and S.P.G., the National Society, the Church Building Society, the Additional Curates Society, the Clergy Orphan Corporation—are still exceedingly alive.

He was, of course, fortunate in the times in which he lived. New blood was coursing through the arteries of the Establishment, and, for the first time since the days of Archbishop Theodore of Tarsus, the Church of England was about to put its administrative house in order. Watson impressed his views not only on Archbishop Manners-Sutton and Archbishop Howley, but, what was more (and, at that juncture, more important), upon those great ecclesiastical reformers, Lord Liverpool and Sir Robert Peel.[3] His own efficiency,

[1] "Joshua Watson took a lively part in opposing a proposition made at the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, to place a well-known manual of the pious Dissenter, Dr Isaac Watts, on the list of the Society. . . . The proposition was rejected, very much on the reasons which Joshua Watson delivered at the meeting on June 7, 1831 . . ." (Churton, pp. 195 ff.).

[2] Published for the Church Historical Society by S.P.C.K. (1954): 15s.

[3] Lord Liverpool (who, I may be allowed to mention, is the only Prime Minister known to have been christened in St Margaret's, Westminster) was a strong Churchman. He was Prime Minister continuously from 1812 to 1827, and introduced the important reform of making *all*, and not merely some, episcopal appointments on grounds of merit without regard to influence. Sir Robert Peel not only followed and standardized his example, but also, by the creation of the Ecclesiastical Commission in 1835, inaugurated the administrative reformation of the Church of England.

as a kind of permanent civil servant of the Church—unobtrusive but ubiquitous, deferential but quietly determined, and, above all, businesslike, practical, and a little cautious—fitted neatly into the new pattern of affairs. At the same time, in many ways and in many directions, Church life was on the upgrade. An old gentleman, Mr Thomas Grenville, who died in 1846 at the age of ninety-one, observed that the greatest change that had taken place in his lifetime was the change in the clergy of the Church of England. In 1835 Canon Sydney Smith of St Paul's remarked good-humouredly to young Mr Gladstone: "Whenever you meet a clergyman of my age, you may be quite sure he is a bad clergyman." The Episcopal Bench itself was being infiltrated by a new type of prelate—such men as Charles James Blomfield and Samuel Wilberforce, who did not wear wigs, and worked with an almost terrifying energy; so very different from the old-fashioned type as represented, for example, by that innocuous diocesan in the south-west of England who was distinguished chiefly as the private tutor of the Royal offspring and the patron of John Constable the artist, and whose placid virtues were celebrated in verse by Dr Samuel Parr:

> *Unsoiled by courts and unseduced by zeal,*
> FISHER *endangers not the common weal.*[1]

In the spring-cleaning of the Established Church between 1811 and 1841, Watson was not the least notable of the new brooms. But if he was fortunate in his times, he was not less fortunate in his associates. He was the leader of a High Church group known as the Hackney Phalanx or the Clapton Sect: one of those groups of individuals united by community of sentiment and by matrimonial alliances which at different times have played so notable a part in the history of the Church of England. (We may think, for example, of the aristocratic Puritan circle round the Earl of Leicester in the reign of Elizabeth I, or of the "Clapham Sect" of Evangelicals who carried through the Abolition of the Slave Trade and of Slavery, or, within living memory, of the *Lux Mundi* school.) Besides Joshua himself, the Hackney Phalanx included his elder brother, John James Watson (1767–1839), Rector of Hackney and Archdeacon of St Albans, together with his brother-in-law and voluntary curate, Henry Handley Norris (1771–1850); Thomas Sikes (1767–1834), Vicar of Guilsborough in Northamptonshire, and the formidable Archdeacon Daubeny (1745–1827), who were both related to the Watsons; William Van Mildert (1765–1836), Bishop of Durham; Christopher Wordsworth (1774-1846), Master of Trinity College, Cambridge; William Stevens (1732–1807), the passive originator of that select and exclusive dining club which is called "Nobody's Friends", and John Bowdler (1746–1823), the irreproachable brother

[1] R. B. Beckett, *John Constable and the Fishers: The Record of a Friendship* (1952), p. 3. John Fisher (1748–1825), sometime Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge, where he was noted for "the suavity of his manners and the peculiarly felicitous manner with which he conveyed instruction", became a Canon of Windsor and tutor to the Duke of Kent (1780–5), Bishop of Exeter (1803) and tutor to the Princess Charlotte (1805), and was translated to Salisbury in 1807.

of the editor of Shakespeare; and two other Archdeacons—for the clerical members of the Phalanx seem to have gravitated naturally to the archidiaconate—Benjamin Harrison (1808–1887) and Edward Churton (1800–1874). It may be noted that the oldest member of this group was born in 1732, and that the youngest member of it died in 1887.

Perhaps under the influence of the evolutionary concept of Progressive Revelation, it has become conventional to regard the Hackney Phalanx simply as precursors of the Tractarians.[1] But this, I think, does less than justice to the Hackney Phalanx. Just as medieval people did not realize that they were living in the Middle Ages, so also Joshua Watson and his friends never though of themselves as "a link with the Oxford Movement". They regarded themselves as old-fashioned English Churchmen, which indeed they were. Joshua himself, who had passed his sixtieth birthday before Mr Keble preached his Assize Sermon, has been more fittingly described by Overton as "the Robert Nelson of the nineteenth century",[2] and his piety no less than his philanthropy was of that earlier vintage.

It is true that John Henry Newman, on an impulse of gratitude for a munificent donation to his church at Littlemore, dedicated the fifth volume of his *Parochial and Plain Sermons* to "Joshua Watson, Esq., D.C.L.,[3] the Benefactor of his brethren, by his long and dutiful ministry, and patient service, to his and their common Mother . . .". They were not, however, personally acquainted: and in fact the Oxford men were apt to be impatient with the sober, peaceable, and truly conscientious temper of the Hackney coterie. "Of course", wrote the author of the *Apologia*, with a delicate sneer, "their *beau ideal* in ecclesiastical action was a board of safe, sound, sensible men".[4] But Watson was a realist: he knew, for example, that whatever it says in the beginning of the Commination Service, Englishmen were not going to submit to be "put to open penance", which was Hurrell Froude's ideal of a *real* Church, as distinct from

[1] It may be that Dr Pusey was inadvertently responsible for this; first, by emphasizing, in a justly celebrated passage of his *Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury* (1842), certain prophetic observations made by the Rev. Thomas Sikes of Guilsborough in 1833, shortly before his death, to the Rev. W. J. Copeland, on the impending and convulsionary revival of that neglected article of the Creed, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church"; and secondly, by writing to Joshua Watson after several interviews with him at Brighton in 1842–3, "One had become so much the object of suspicion, that I cannot say how cheering it was to be recognized by you as carrying on the same torch which which we had received from yourself and from those of your generation, who had remained faithful to the old teaching. . . ." Liddon (*Life of Pusey*, vol. i, p. 257) states that Sikes "was especially regarded by Pusey as a precursor of the Oxford movement". Copeland, before returning to Oxford as a Fellow of Trinity in 1832, had been curate to Archdeacon Watson at Hackney (Webster, p. 98).

[2] J. H. Overton, *The English Church in the Nineteenth Century (1800–1833)*, p. 33. The standard biography of the pious Robert Nelson (1665–1715), Nonjuror and philanthropist, is by C. F. Secretan (1860).

[3] The inscription on the Watson family tomb in the churchyard of St John at Hackney inaccurately describes Joshua as "LL.D."

[4] J. H. Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (Everyman edtn), p. 60.

a *national* one.[1] And I think that one of the most important things in Mr Webster's admirable biography is the chapter[2] in which he shows for the first time how, when Newman capitulated to the pretensions of the Church of Rome, it was Joshua Watson who anticipated and allayed the resultant panic, not only among his friends in England, but also in distant Colonial outposts overseas. There is a place in the Divine oeconomy of Christian action for "safe, sound, sensible men". Indeed, great as is the debt, direct and indirect, of everyone present here to-day to the Catholic Revival in the nineteenth century, it has still to be remembered that the older High Church piety, for all its limitations, represented a permanent and a pervasive element in the character of the Church of England. The Hackney Phalanx were the precursors of the Oxford Movement in the sense in which the tortoise in the fable was the precursor of the hare.

So, having served his generation by the will of God, Joshua Watson fell on sleep, and was buried on February 7, 1855, in the family vault outside the parish church of Hackney where he had regularly worshipped.[3] The funeral, by his own desire, was simple and inexpensive. "He was", wrote Bishop Blomfield, "the most remarkable instance I have ever personally known, of a Christian man, devoting all the faculties with which God had endowed him, and a very large portion of the means which are more valuable in the world's estimate though not in *his*, to the promotion of God's glory in His Church. . . . The young men of this generation are but little aware of what the Church of England owes to my venerable friend."[4]

Your Grace—my Lords—Mr Mayor—ladies and gentlemen—I give you "The Immortal Memory of Joshua Watson".

Charles Smyth.

The Abundance of the Gospel

The epistles to the Ephesians, the Colossians, and the Philippians are full of references to the abundance of the life in Christ, and this abundance and its opposite, the nothingness or emptines of life without Christ, are an integral part of the atmosphere of thought which lies behind the Pauline corpus. It is obvious, for instance, that Paul regards his work for Christ as the very opposite of nothingness or vanity. "Thanks be to God", he writes to the Corinthians, "I am

[1] "The body of the English nation either are sincere Christians or they are not: if they are, they will submit to Discipline as readily as the primitive Christians did. If not, let us tell the truth and shame the devil: let us give up a *national* Church and have a *real* one." ("Remarks on Church Discipline", written in 1834, in *Remains of the late Reverend Richard Hurrell Froude, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford*, vol. iii, 1839, p. 274.) It is fair to point out that this paragraph is seldom quoted in its entirety.

[2] Ch. viii ("The Oxford Movement: Gain and Loss"), esp. p. 111.

[3] He is commemorated inside the church by a plain mural tablet to the right of the altar, with the following inscription: "Joshua Watson. Born May IX. MDCCLXXI. Died Jan. 30. MDCCCLV. God giveth to a man that is good in His sight, wisdom and knowledge and joy. Eccles. c. ij. v. xxvj."

[4] Churton, p. 380.

what I am, and his grace given to me has not become empty (κενή,) but I have worked more abundantly (περισσότερον) than they all."[1] This conception of "emptiness" or "nothingness" occurs so frequently as the opposite of the preaching of the kerygma of Christ or of work in his name that it seems that the antonyms "fullness" and "emptiness" must always have been in Paul's mind when he wrote or spoke as an apostle. Thus, to the Galatians he writes: "I went up, as had been revealed to me, and placed before them the Gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but privately to those of repute, lest by any means I might be running, or have run, for nothing."[2] To have so run would have been to do not Christ's work but the tempter's, and it is with a similar thought in mind that he writes to the Thessalonians, "Therefore, when I could stand it no longer I sent to know about your faith, lest the tempter had tried you in some way, and our labour had been for nothing (εἰς κενόν)", that is to say, for the Devil. Earlier in the same epistle he has written of his visit to Thessalonica as not being "for nothing": "For you know yourselves, my brothers, that our coming to you was not for nothing (κενή) . . . but we were emboldened by God to preach to you (with great difficulty) the Gospel of God".[3] At the end of the epistle to the Philippians there is a passage in which Paul expresses his gratitude for the "abundance" in Christ which his converts have shown. "I have everything and abound," he writes, "having received from Epaphroditus that which you had sent—a sweet-smelling odour, a sacrifice acceptable and pleasing to God—I have been made full."[4] He has been made full: that is part of the meaning of being a Christian, and Paul tells his readers, "I know how to be humbled, and how to abound. In every respect I have learned to be filled and to be hungry, to abound and to be in need."[5]

This conception of the abundance of the life in Christ is not, of course, confined in the New Testament to the writings of St Paul. In the Fourth Gospel, for instance, our Lord is reported as saying, "I came that they might have life, and that they might have it abundantly (περισσόν)."[6] There is an echo of this thought in the parable of the rich man who pulled down his barns and built greater: "The life of a man is not in the abundance of his possessions", "So is he who hoards for himself, and is not rich towards God".[7] And St John's imagery of light and darkness is obviously akin to St Paul's image of fullness and emptiness. Light, like fullness, is positive, and darkness is the negative of light, just as emptiness is the negative of fullness. It is more natural to speak of a room being full of light than full of darkness, and although it is, of course, possible to speak of a room being full of darkness, to do so is to use a strong image—stronger than the image of a room full of light, precisely because it is a less natural image. The distinction between light and darkness is again evident in the primitive use of the term "enlightenment" for baptism,[8] and Tertullian tells how the newly

[1] 1 Cor. 15. 10. [2] Gal. 2. 2. [3] 1 Thess. 3. 5 f.; 2. 1 f.
[4] Phil. 4. 18. [5] Phil. 4. 12. [6] John 10. 10.
[7] Luke 12. 15, 21. [8] Cf. Heb. 6. 4; 10. 32.

baptized "taste first of all a mixture of milk and honey"—presumably as a sign that they have left the wilderness which is the emptiness or nothingness of the world, and have entered into the abundance of the promised land, which is life "in Christ".[1]

Strangely enough, the adjective *πλήρης* does not occur in Paul,[2] but *πληροφορέω* occurs five times (counting two references in Timothy) and *πληροφορία* twice. Both these words are particularly associated with life in the body of Christ: the Colossians, for instance, are told that Epaphras is battling in his prayers that they might be established as "perfect and fully assured" (*τέλειοι καὶ πεπληροφορημένοι*),[3] and Paul tells them what a great struggle he himself has that they "should be confirmed in love and into every wealth of the assurance (*πληροφορία*) of understanding, and into knowledge of the *μυστήριον* of God, which is Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge".[4] Both *πληροφορία* and *πληροφορέω* occur, as we should expect, in close proximity to words connected with the proclamation of the Gospel: Timothy is told to be ever watchful, to endure evil, to do the work of an evangelist, and to confirm his ministry (*τὴν διακονίαν σου πληροφόρησον*);[5] and Paul (if, indeed, he be the writer) speaks a few verses farther on of the kerygma being fulfilled (*πληροφορέω*);[6] to the Thessalonians he writes: "Our gospel did not come to you in word alone, but also with power and the Holy Spirit and great assurance (*πληροφορία*)".[7] It is interesting to note that for Paul's companion Luke the events of the Christian gospel are "those things which have been fulfilled among us".[8] Luke is probably thinking here of the fulfilment of prophecy, but he can hardly have written of fulfilment without thinking of the significance Paul was showing in the Christian fulfilment and fullness.

Other words, which (as the concordance shows) carry for Paul the primary meaning of Christian fullness or abundance, are *παρρησία, περισσεία, ἀπορηθέικμα, περισσεύω, ὑπερεκπερισσοῦ, ὑπερεκπερισσῶς*. This idea of abundance is closely connected with grace. "If by the transgression of one man", he writes to the Romans, "death reigned through him, how much more shall they who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness reign through the one Jesus Christ. . . . Where sin increased, grace more than abounded."[9] It is as if the world's nothingness of sin makes an effort—and that not a feeble one—to become something, to increase, to abound; but it is easily surpassed, and, indeed, beaten back by the superabundance of the grace of Christ. There is another great passage at 2 Cor. 4. 15: "All things are for your sakes in order that the grace which is increased by means of the thanksgiving (*εὐχαριστία*) of many might abound to the glory of God." A little later Paul urges them—in the manner of the New Testament—to become what they in fact are. "We pray

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[1] *De Cor. Mil.* 3, 4.

[2] According to the account in Acts, Paul addressed Elymas the magician at Paphos as "full of all guile and all fraud", where *πλήρης* is used (Acts 13. 9). Here the reference is to an unchristian fullness, as at Rom. 1. 19.

[3] Col. 4. 12. [4] Col. 2. 1 ff. [5] 2 Tim. 4. 5. [6] 2 Tim. 4. 17.

[7] Thess. 1. 5. [8] Luke 1. 1. [9] Rom. 5. 17, 20.

also", he writes, "that you should not receive the gift of God in vain (*εἰς κενόν*)."[1]

Grace is, of course, the manifestation of the abundance and generosity, the "riches", the fullness, of God. Acknowledging that he is himself nothing, yet the Christian knows that God's purpose is that he should become something, that (to use Paul's term) he should "abound"—receive the fullness of the Gospel and work towards the fulfilling of Christ.[2] That is the paradox of the Pauline concept of fullness and emptiness. After all, as we are told in the famous "kenosis" passage in Philippians,[3] Christ has emptied himself, made himself nothing. The central passage, however, is that in 2 Corinthians:[4] "For you know of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that for your sakes he who was rich became poor, in order that by his poverty you might be rich." Or, as we might paraphrase it, he who is fullness itself emptied himself that by his emptiness you might be filled. So the Christian, following in the footsteps of his Lord, must, to fulfil his destiny, be emptied of all that does not belong to that divine heritage. "I live," cries Paul, "yet not I, but Christ lives in me."[5] That is the result of the emptying of the self, or, as Paul also expresses it, the crucifying of the self: "I am crucified with Christ"; "Our old man was crucified with him".[6] In his researches into religious experience, William James found the same principle at work, albeit on a lower plane. He quotes Alphonse Daudet who speaks of "this second me that I have never been able to intoxicate, to make shed tears, or put to sleep".[7] "This second me" would be for Paul the unemptied self, the self unfulfilled by Christ.

> "Starbuck [says James] seems to put his finger on the root of the matter when he says that to exercise the personal will is still to live in the region where the imperfect self is the thing most emphasized. Where, on the contrary, the subconscious forces take the lead, it is more probably the better self *in posse* which directs the operation. Instead of being clumsily and vaguely aimed at from without, it is then itself the organizing centre. What then must the person do? 'He must relax', says Dr Starbuck,—'that is, he must fall back on the larger power that makes for righteousness, which has been welling up in his own being, and let it finish in its own way the work it has begun. . . . The act of yielding, in this point of view, is giving one's self over to the new life, making it the centre of a new personality, and living from within, the truth of it which had before been viewed objectively."[8]

Now, this is all very Pauline, yet, strangely enough, James does not mention Paul. Paul, of course, is much more explicit about "the Power" upon which—in his case the Person upon whom—he "falls back", but the general conception of Starbuck is Paul's conception

[1] 2 Cor. 6. 1. [2] Cf. Eph. 1. 23 [3] Phil. 2. 7.
[4] 2 Cor. 8. 9; cf. 8. 2, where the Macedonians are praised for their (Christlike) poverty. [5] Gal. 2. 20. [6] Gal. 6. 20; Rom. 6. 6.
[7] Wm James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), p. 168, quoting A. Daudet, *Notes sur la Vie*, p. 1. [8] Op. cit., p. 209 f.

of emptying and fulfilment. The self is "given over to the new life" which comes from the "Power that makes for righteousness, which has been welling up"—an interesting and significant expression—"in his own being". Here, then, is the Pauline "abundance", and we can describe as "abundance" or "fulfilment" the feeling which must accompany the "living from within" the new life, the truth of which "had before been viewed objectively". This same sense of moving from emptiness to fullness is to be found in many of the stories of "conversions" which James collected and analysed. "All my feelings seemed to rise and flow out", wrote one convert, "and the utterance of my heart was, 'I want to pour my whole soul out to God'."[1] The sense of fullness is there, especially in the words, "rise", "flow out", and "pour", even though there is no mention of Christ. Paul, in fact, christens this fundamental human conception of fullness and emptiness, and in its Christian form it has become a commonplace of the language of devotion. Cardinal Bérulle, for instance, writes that "Our first knowledge ought to be of our nothingness, our imperfection, and lack of being, so our first movement ought to be to Jesus as to the fullness and accomplishment of our being".[2] Scaramelli, writing of the importance of fear in the Christian life, remarks that it "consists in the consideration of our own nothingness, insufficiency, weakness, faults, shortcomings and inborn propensities, which incline us to evil; all which motives inspire the soul with distrust of self and keep us in humility and lowly-mindness. . . . Without it the soul resembles a ship with sails fully set but without ballast; the lighter it travels, the greater the risk it runs of stranding and of wreck".[3]

Augustine of Hippo shares with St Paul the distinction of being one of Christendom's two most famous "twice-born men", and in the story of his conversion, as he tells it in the *Confessions*, we may notice a background of thought similar to that of Paul. On the day of his conversion, there apeared to him "the chaste dignity of Continency". Incontinency, as Augustine well knew, is the wrong sort of abundance—a fullness which is not "contained": spiritually it spells nothingness. Continency, on the other hand, although it means making nothing of the self, is achieved through the abundance of grace. Together with this appearance of continency, Augustine employs the imagery of a storm. "There arose a mighty storm", he says, "bringing a mighty shower of tears, which that I might pour forth wholly in its natural expressions, I rose from Alypius [his companion]; solitude was suggested to me as fitter for the business of weeping; so I retired so far that even his presence could not be a burthen to me".[4] In this picture of the storm there are two elements relevant to our present purpose: 1. Augustine was (as we say) "full to overflowing" with a false fullness or abundance which is about to

[1] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 254.
[2] *Œuvres complètes* (Paris, 1856), p. 1, 181; quoted by Bede Frost, *Priesthood and Prayer* (1933), p. 52.
[3] J. B. Scaramelli, *Directorium Asceticum*, Treat. iv. 92, 126; quoted by K. E. Kirk, *Some Principles of Moral Theology* (1920), p. 46.
[4] *Confessions*, VIII, 12 (Pusey's translation).

be brought to nothing in her conversion to Christ; as he says, it is "poured forth wholly" in his tears; 2. "Solitude was suggested to me", he says, "as fitter for the business of weeping." In conversation or even in companionship without conversation, there is intercourse, a "running between" one and the other. As he comes at last to recognize and enter into the fullness of Christ, Augustine demands the nothingness, the emptiness, of his "own company". Thus, in Augustine as in Paul we find the thought of the fullness of Christ which is, paradoxically, self-emptiness, and the false fullness of the world which is, in fact, utter emptiness.

The whole matter is summed up by Paul in the famous hymn of 1 Corinthians 13, and because the conceptions of emptiness and fullness are here implicit rather than explicit this passage shows how they would be at the back of Paul's mind (if they did not come to the front) whenever he spoke of the Christian life.[1] "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels"—with that fullness of overflowing glossolalia which was one of the characteristics of primitive Christianity—"and have not love, I have become ringing brass or crashing cymbal", mere empty noise. Without love, all prophecy, all knowledge, all faith even, are empty and vain. One might give oneself to martyrdom, become (as it might seem) nothing, as Christ became nothing; but, without love, that "nothing" is the emptiness of the world, not the emptiness (which in another sense is the fullness and abundance) of true humiliation; martyrdom without love does not deserve the name. Here our two kinds of emptiness are made quite plain; good works without love issue from pride, that worldly emptiness that puffs itself up to seem full of love; but love, in fact, "vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up", love is true fullness and does not need to descend to the empty show of pride;[2] love, because it imitates the divine emptying of Christ, cannot but work towards the fulfilment of God's purpose. In the fulfilment of God's purpose not the least part is that played by the Church which is the body of Christ. In Christ, Paul teaches, "dwells all the fullness (*πλήρωμα*) of the Godhead bodily (*σωματικῶς*)".[3] If, with Dr Armitage Robinson, we take *σωματικῶς* to mean here not only "in the physical body of Jesus" but also "in the body which is his Church", we must relate these words to those of Eph. 1. 23, which Robinson and others, taking *πληρουμένου* to be passive, make to mean "the Church which is his body, the fullness of him who is being fulfilled through all things in all". This wonderful "fulfilling", then, is the function of the members of Christ's body the Church; with him as their head, they have the responsibility of building up the new redeemed manhood, the "perfect man", "not as if his work were incomplete or our efforts meritorious, but as being living members of his Body through which he is pleased to manifest that which he has wrought for men".[4] And all this springs from the nothingness of the divine

[1] Love and fullness are explicitly connected at Eph. 3. 19.
[2] Cf. Scaramelli's ship with sails fully set but without ballast, supra, p. 77.
[3] Col. 2. 9.
[4] B. F. Westcott, *Christus Consummator* (1887), p.27. Cf. J. A. Robinson, *St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* (1903), pp. 42 ff., 88 f.

humility of Christ in being made man. "Now remain faith, hope, love, these three, but the greatest of these is love."[1] It is rhetoric but it is also fact. Love lies behind the Creation, the Incarnation, in the whole nothingness of Christ's earthly life which culminates in the nothingness of the Cross, the real meaning of which is seen only in the light of the fullness of the joy of Easter, which issues from the emptiness of the tomb. This emptiness or nothingness it was Paul's life work to preach. "From Jerusalem, and round about even to Illyricum, I have fully preached the gospel of Christ."[2] So he writes to the Romans; but this "full" gospel has nothing to do with the abundance of clever words such as he had heard the philosophers use at Areopagus.[3] "Christ did not send me to baptize but to preach", he tells the Corinthians, "not with clever speech (*οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου*)" —with its emptiness of subtle reasoning—"lest I should empty the Cross of Christ".[4] Christ's Cross is Christ's emptiness; faith alone sees in it the fullness which Paul preaches. To the world filled with wisdom it is emptiness, a void fable "signifying nothing". "The word of the Cross is foolishness to those who are being lost, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God."[5] By faithful preaching the Cross must be filled in that general fulfilment of Christ which is the function of his Church.

G. F. Dowden.

Feeling and Understanding

Professor Tillich has recently called for a renewed examination of the theology of Schleiermacher, who, he thinks, has been the victim of mistaken interpretation.[6] Schleiermacher's famous definition of religion as the "feeling of absolute dependence" has been rejected as romanticism or sentimentalism or irrationalism, because it was suposed to banish religion to the regions of subjective emotion. Apparently Tillich himself took this view at one time, for he wrote that "Schleiermacher injured the understanding of religion . . . by delivering it to emotional subjectivity".[7] But now, we are told, all this criticism is beside the point. Feeling, as Schleiermacher understood it, is not a mere subjective emotion but has a cognitive function. It refers to "the awareness of that which transcends intellect and will, subject and object".[8] It is to be compared with Otto's "creaturely feeling" and Tillich's own concept of "ultimate concern". The suggestion here is that feeling is much more than the "mere feeling" or subjective emotion that it is often suposed to be. If this suggestion is correct, then much of our suspicion of feeling may be unfounded, and the theologian has a duty to seek a clearer

[1] 1 Cor. 13. 13.
[2] *πεπληρωκέναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*. Rom. 15. 19.
[3] Acts 17. 16 ff.
[4] 1 Cor. 1. 17.
[5] 1 Cor. 1. 18.
[6] *Systematic Theology*, I (London, 1953), pp. 18, 47, 170.
[7] *Two Types of Philosophy of Religion* (New York, N.D.), p. 10.
[8] *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 47.

understanding of what feeling really is, and of its place in the structure of religion.

Tillich's remarks are timely from another point of view, because there is a number of influential contemporary philosophers who assert that religion is a matter of feeling, which they understand as "mere feeling". Professor Ayer, for instance, has contended that ethical and religious statements are not genuine propositions but pseudo-propositions.[1] By this he means that they do not make any significant assertion but simply evince feeling, and therefore they can be neither true nor false but are strictly meaningless. Of course, not all philosophers of the empiricist school would follow Ayer on these points. Toulmin rejects Ayer's view of ethics, and he says that it is only if we mistakenly regard religious questions as being of the same nature as scientific questions "that we have any grounds for concluding with Ayer that all utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical".[2] The more moderate type of logical analyst would say not that ethical and religious statements are neither true nor false and therefore devoid of sense, but that their truth or falsity is to be judged by criteria other than those which apply in the case of the statements of empirical science—and in this he would seem to be right. Nevertheless there are still many who take the more extreme view that the statements of religion are meaningless. They refer to nothing in reality, but simply serve to express subjective feelings which some people happen to have while others do not.

It is an error to attempt to reply to this denial of the validity of religious statements by seeking to rationalize them and to minimize the element of feeling which is bound up with them. The mistake consists precisely in this, that it is a tacit acceptance of the false presupposition on which the denial itself is based, namely that feeling is "mere feeling", a subjective emotion without any cognitive function. The correct procedure is not to fall over backwards in an attempt to get away from feeling, but to show that the opposition between feeling and understanding, on which the denial of meaning to religious statements rests, is false and misleading. Therefore we are again directed to follow up the clue afforded by Tillich's remarks.

As Professor Farmer points out, feelings are highly specific.[3] Pure feeling is an abstraction. There are moral feelings and religious feelings, and on a more mundane level there are feelings like fear and boredom, and even within such groupings feelings differ in kind. They differ according to the different situations which evoke them. Thus every feeling includes a reference to a situation in the world, and arises in the interaction of the self and the world.

Further, every feeling carries with it an understanding of the situation to which it refers. It asserts that the situation has a certain character. A feeling of fear, for example, asserts that something is menacing. Of course, the understanding which belongs to feeling

[1] *Language, Truth and Logic* (2nd ed., London, 1946).
[2] *Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge, 1950), p. 212.
[3] *Revelation and Religion* (London, 1954), pp. 74–5.

may be only rarely put into words. No doubt man feared before he had a term for or a concept of the menacing. But already the understanding was implicit in his fear as a pre-conceptual awareness of the menacing. And so with all other feelings. Whether or not what they give us to understand is put into words, it is always in principle capable of being made explicit as a proposition which expresses what the feeling itself implicitly asserts about the situation which has evoked it. In other words, there are no "mere feelings", but only feelings which give us to understand something and make assertions.

Thus when Ayer says that a sentence of the form, "Your going to London last week was wrong" asserts no more than "You went to London last week", conjoined with a feeling of disapproval,[1] he has by no means shown that "wrong" is a meaningless symbol, an interjection expressive of a subjective emotion. For the feeling of disapproval is no mere emotion, but the implicit assertion. "This is wrong." As Sir David Ross puts it, "it is impossible to disapprove without thinking that whatever you disapprove is *worthy of disapproval*".[2] All that Ayer has shown is that the original sentence can be broken up into two shorter sentences, "You went to London last week", and, "That was wrong", and this is useful in so far as it draws attention to the fact that the two sentences seem to be making assertions of different kinds. The first is a plain factual proposition, easily verifiable by some empirical test or other. The second is an ethical judgment which does not seem to be so obviously verifiable, yet, as we have seen, it makes an assertion. Ayer has not explained away its meaning, but has made the problem of its meaning more urgent.

At this point we may receive some help from certain of the existentialist philosophers, whose investigation of feeling will confirm that to every feeling belongs its own understanding, and will throw further light on the nature of that understanding. Sartre wrote a book round the feeling of disgust.[3] The book consists largely of a day-to-day description of passing moods, and the reader is left with the impression that Sartre has tried to convey to him through the descriptions of changeable feelings an understanding of human existence which he could not have expressed in any other way. Much more exact and philosophical is Heidegger's analysis of feeling.[4] He does not use the term "feeling" but rejects it, like other traditional terms, because of the misleading associations which have gathered round it—and of these the chief is the notion of "mere feeling" or subjective emotion. He prefers to speak of state or condition (*Befindlichkeit*) or alternatively of mood, and he mentions fear as a typical example of what he has in mind.

There are three points to notice in Heidegger's treatment of these feeling-states. (1) The first has already been sufficiently stressed—it is that to every such state belongs its own understanding. In Heideg-

[1] *Language, Truth and Logic*, pp. 107–9.
[2] *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford, 1939), p. 34.
[3] *La Nausée* (Paris, 1938).
[4] *Sein und Zeit* (6th ed., Tübingen, 1949), p. 134.

ger's terminology, it *discloses* something to us. Clearly this disclosure is different from the perception of an object through the senses. Yet it gives us to understand something, it asserts that to something there belongs a certain character, and although the understanding may be only implicit in a passing mood, it is always in principle capable of being made explicit through analysis. (2) That which is disclosed is a structure or pattern. We said already that a feeling is evoked by a situation, and that is more accurate than to say that it is evoked by an object, even if it has a special reference to some object in the situation. Considered purely as an object, nothing can have ascribed to it any other properties than those perceptible by the senses, or at any rate deducible from sense-perception. Your going to London, as mere observable occurrence, has no moral character. It can only evoke a feeling of disapproval when it is disclosed in a structural context which gives it its character of being wrong. Again, the same tiger which would be disclosed as menacing were I to meet him in my back garden would evoke no fear and would not have a menacing character were I to view him suitably restrained at the zoo. (3) The structures thus disclosed, together with the characters to which they give meaning, and which we are given to understand in the disclosure, are neither subjective nor objective. They embrace both the self and the world, that is, they belong to existence, and the understanding of them may be called existential. It is prior to the separation of subject and object. Any purely subjective and any purely objective understanding is an abstraction from the self-world correlation which alone makes any understanding possible. Such purely subjective or purely objective understandings are therefore fragmentary. That is why Heidegger claims that the insight implicit in a mood is more *original* than any purely objective understanding. Again, he says that even the most penetrating objective understanding could never disclose the menacing. This also helps us to understand more clearly Tillich's remark, already quoted, that feeling, as Schleiermacher conceived it, refers to "the awareness of that which transcends intellect and will, *subject and object*".

Heidegger recognizes a fundamental feeling-state (*Grundbefindlichkeit*) which, he claims, yields a disclosure of a unique kind. This fundamental state he identifies with ontological anxiety.[1] Such anxiety, unlike other moods such as our fears, is not evoked by any particular situation, but by man's total situation as a being thrown into existence, knowing neither his whence nor his whither, but simply that he is in the world. It discloses man to himself in his finitude, as limited possibility. This notion immediately invites comparison with the religious feelings already mentioned—not only with Otto's creaturely feeling, but with Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence and Tillich's ultimate concern. In the last two, the terms "absolute" and "ultimate" indicate the same reference to a total situation. It may well be, of course, that religious feeling will be evoked by some particular object, but that will happen only in

[1] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 184.

so far as the object has acquired the character of a religious symbol and points beyong itself to the total situation.

Curiously enough, we find a tacit recognition of this notion of religious feeling in Professor Ayer also. Having denied that there can be any quarrel between science and religion (on the ground that there can be no logical relation between the propositions of science and the nonsensical pseudo-propositions of religion!) he goes on to say that there may be antagonism between the two for another reason. This is that "science tends to destroy the feeling of awe".[1] It holds out to man the prospect of increasing mastery over natural phenomena, and weakens the sense of his finitude and inability to determine his own destiny. It is therefore not strictly science but a dogma (for one could scarcely call it an empirical hypothesis) of human self-sufficiency born of scientific and technical advance which is alleged to destroy the feeling of awe. But what does "to destroy the feeling of awe" mean, except to contradict the understanding implicit in that feeling, namely, that man is not self-sufficient, but a finite creature before God? There is a logical relation involved here between an assertion about man implicit in religious feeling, and a secular theory of man which one would expect to be popular in an age of technocracy. And since there is a logical relation, then religious statements have meaning after all! Actually in this passage Ayer has put his finger on a main source of irreligion, but the phenomenon which he describes has been known at least since the writers of Genesis set down the story of the Tower of Babel. But our concern is to note that here we have a tacit recognition that to a religious feeling similar to those which we have already noted there belongs an implicit understanding which is meaningful.

Let us now pause to see where the argument has led us. We began with the reaction among theologians against Schleiermacher's view of the place of feeling in religion, and we widened the argument to take in views that religious statements are nothing but expressions of subjective emotion, nonsensical utterances devoid of meaning. Following Tillich's suggestion, we endeavoured to show that both of these positions arise from a misunderstanding of the nature of feeling. Feeling is never divorced from cognition, and always makes an implicit assertion. We acknowledged that what is asserted in this way is different from what is asserted in a factual proposition, and making use of Heidegger's analysis, we found that the meaning of the assertions which are implicit in feeling lies in structures in which both self and world participate, that is to say, they come before the separation of subject and object. The position therefore is that we have found the assertions of our feeling-states to be meaningful, and therefore capable of being either true or false. The problem now is to find the criterion for judging the truth of such assertions, for even if the understanding which belongs to feeling is, as Heidegger says, an original one, it is also a fallible one. I can fear something which is not really menacing, as in a phobia, and I can rever-

[1] *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 178.

ence something which is not really holy, as in idolatry. The feeling-state does not create the character which is asserted, but discloses it, since the character is no more subjective than it is objective. Heidegger recognizes three possibilities of error.[1] There may be failure to recognize a character, or the character may be buried over, or—the commonest and most dangerous case—the character is misplaced or put in place of another. How then are we to sift and criticize the understandings that belong to feeling, and especially to religious feeling, which is our chief concern here?

It should be obvious at once that the methods of logical analysis which are applicable to the objective statements of science have no relevance here, since, as we have seen, religious statements are of a different kind from scientific propositions and require a different criterion. But the trouble is, to quote a picturesque sentence of Toulmin, that "the question of God's existence is often discussed by philosophers in a way which would only be appropriate, if it were the literal counterpart of the question, 'Are there any one-eyed cats?' "[2] It is little wonder that when such methods of discussion are used, religious assertions come to appear as either meaningless or false. Tillich says bluntly that attempts to prove the existence of God as an object are bound to lead to negative conclusions, because God is not an object.[3] Dom Illtyd Trethowan has recently helped to dispel some of the misunderstandings which encourage this false approach to the question of the validity of religious statements.[4]

The difficulty about rejecting the method of logical analysis lies in this, that the theologian seems to be saying that he is not going to submit his statements to the same kind of tests that are applied in most other branches of inquiry. But this difficulty disappears when it is understood that religious statements (of the kind which we have considered here) are of a different order from factual propositions. The obvious criterion for religious statements is some form of phenomenology. Heidegger expounds a method of phenomenology which is a modification of Husserl's, but it will be sufficient here to quote what Tillich says on the subject: "Theology must apply the phenomenological approach to all its basic concepts, forcing its critics first of all to see what the criticized concepts mean and also forcing itself to make careful descriptions of its concepts and to use them with logical consistency, thus avoiding the danger of trying to fill in logical gaps with devotional material. . . . The test of a phenomenological description is that the picture given by it is convincing, that it can be seen by anyone who is willing to look in the same direction, that the description illuminates other related ideas, and that it makes the reality which these ideas are supposed to reflect understandable. Phenomenology is a way of pointing to phenomena as they 'give themselves', without the interference of negative or positive prejudices and explanations."[5] If, as we have seen reason to believe, religious statements point to the fundamental

[1] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 36. [2] *Reason in Ethics*, p. 213. [3] *Two Types*, p. 11.
[4] *An Essay in Christian Philosophy* (London, 1954).
[5] *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 118.

structures of man's existence and are not factual propositions about objects in the world, then the method which Tillich describes would seem to be the appropriate one for sifting and criticizing what these statements give us to understand.

We conclude that the basic religious feelings should be neither ignored by the theologian nor dismissed as irrelevant by the philosopher, as though they had nothing to tell us. One part of theology consists in the explication of the disclosures which belong to such feelings, and in the analysis and clarification of that which they give us to understand. And there is another consideration which shows that this task has more than theoretical importance. Tillich says that in his experience "the most impressive way of introducing people into the meaning of religion" has been to begin with experiences like anxiety, care, and the like.[1] The person accustomed to matter-of-fact ways of thinking to whom even the simplest statement of Christian doctrine may seem puzzling and irrelevant is nevertheless likely to be acquainted with feelings such as awe, anxiety, and the rest. These offer a point of departure for the attempt to make religion meaningful to such a person, if we can show him that such feelings are not mere emotions without significance, but arise from and disclose the very structures of human existence, which can only rest in God.

JOHN MACQUARRIE.

A Call to a Christian Sacrificial Revolution

MARXISM has now become the official creed of large parts of the world's population. It is therefore sensible, if we think Communism is "here to stay" for a while, to begin thinking in terms of explaining Christian theology in a way which, without compromising Christian truth, will commend it to the young man or woman who has been educated in a Communist society (other, personal, contact with the faith being assumed).

On the philosophical side, we will have to deal with people who espouse "materialism". (We need not bother, here, with the "dialectical" aspect.) Marxian materialism certainly asserts that matter and its motions have no source or cause which lies metaphysically "outside" the material world. This indubitably implies atheism. But it would not be very difficult to show that however tenaciously Marx and his followers have clung to atheism this is not the primary and most essential affirmation of Marxian materialism. The fundamental assertion, which was made in the first instance over against Hegelian idealism, is rather that in the material/spiritual world in which we live—what Christians call the created world—matter is philosophically primary. The human mind appears late in world "history" and it appears closely bound up—dialectically bound up—

[1] *Two Types*, p. 12.

with matter in the form of the human body. The ultimate *value* of a mental operation may indeed be superior to that of the cortical events which underlie it and which take place entirely for its sake, but considered simply as *operations*, the events in the brain are primary while their corresponding thoughts are secondary. This view of the relation of mind and matter presupposes—though it is not exactly equivalent to—a Realist metaphysics; that is, it insists that the material world is real and substantial and in no sense a mere "permanent possibility of sensation".

Now, while the Christian must certainly reject "materialism" in the respect in which it implies atheism, he must as certainly accept it in this other, anti-idealistic sense. And Christians ought to be grateful to Marxians for insisting upon this second aspect of their "materialism". This for two reasons: (1) It helps us to know what changes are possible in certain given situations, especially social situations, and something of the order in which these changes must be promoted. This kind of help is invaluable for those who recognize a responsibility to prepare the way for the consummation of the Kingdom of God on earth. (2) It confirms and illuminates the sacramental character of our Christian worship. We believe that by using certain material things in certain ways and with certain intentions the Church makes possible real, though metaphysical, operations within the Body of Christ, and that without these sacraments the process of applying our Lord's redeeming power to the world would cease.

There is therefore a real basis for confidence in confronting the problem of winning for Christianity persons who have been nurtured within a Communist society. We are not obliged to say flatly, "Your materialism is all wrong." Rather, we are in a position to say, "A great part of your materialism is true and should be developed in this direction." The chief problem will be in persuading such persons that no whit of the truth in their materialism need be sacrificed if they are to believe in a destiny for themselves and the world which carries them beyond history, beyond time and space. For it is in respect of the content of man's "hope" that the teachings of Communism and Christianity appear—or are being made to appear—so divergent. Can we both accept the Communist vision of a just society and also persuade the visionary to look beyond it to the eternal Kingdom of God; indeed, to catch a glimpse of this timeless Commonwealth even while he struggles for its secure foundation in space and time?

This is the sort of question to which a recent book[1] by Dr. F. H. Smyth, S.C.C., provides the answer. It does so by developing a view of sacrifice in general, and of our Lord's sacrifice on the Cross and in the Eucharist in particular, which makes explicit the "materialist" character of the Christian sacrifice and the way in which it moves all achievements on the level of history to their proper consummation beyond history.

[1] *Sacrifice: A Doctrinal Homily*, by F. Hastings Smyth, Superior, Society of the Catholic Commonwealth, N.Y., 1953.

The feature of "movement" is important to the Marxian. He is very much concerned to change existing order, to *move* society, or at least to direct its natural historical movement to a certain consummation and beyond it. If the Christian is to "answer" him adequately he must show how the dimension of eternity may be seen as a *terminus* to which further "movement" may take place. The Marxian must become dissatisfied with the vision of movement merely on the level of history—though nothing will persuade him, thank Heaven, to be satisfied with any hope which does not incorporate a just society on earth.

How is such movement accomplished? The testimony of thousands of years of heathen and Hebrew worship is that it is accomplished by material sacrifice. Before the word "sacrifice" acquired its weakened meaning of mere self-denial for some cause it meant the conveyance of some material gift to God. Prayer could be no substitute, nor could mere service. Service was performed, and remained, on the level of time and space. Prayer indeed transgressed the barrier between time and God's eternity, but it carried nothing with it. It was like a message sent by telegraph. It could promise commerce but not perform it. On the basis, then, that every sacrifice is intended actually to *convey* a gift to God, and not merely to *offer* it to him as a token of our faithfulness, Dr Smyth asks us to consider whether the deepest aim of sacrifice is not to convey the material world, with its spiritual superstructure, out of time into eternity, i.e. back to God whence it came. Man sacrifices not primarily in order to please God, nor to propitiate him, nor to buy his freedom back from him (this, despite my commercial metaphor above), but to do with the created order that which alone can fulfil its potentiality, perfect its being.

It is clear, too, that every sacrifice must be representative. You cannot do with your whole material environment what you can do with a calf, or the Body of a Man or, indeed, with a few pieces of bread and a little wine. But is this representativeness anything more than symbolic? Dr Smyth says it is, and makes use of the concept of "substance" to explain exactly how it is. Every material gift brought forward for sacrifice is a substance which has issued forth from a particular skein of historical events. Thus, as is often pointed out nowadays, our Eucharistic bread and wine have come to us through many agricultural, industrial and commercial operations, and by the work of many human hands and heads. May it not be that the bread and wine metaphysically *embody* their histories? Besides weight, shape, size, texture and chemical composition, i.e. their physical properties, they also possess a kind of metaphysical "depth" in time, without which they would not be what they are. This non-physical character which they possess, says Dr Smyth, is their substance, that which underlies their physical character. It is a *real* character, not merely a symbolic one. Here, then, is the clue to an interpretation of Transubstantiation which can allay the fears behind the XXVIIIth Article of Religion. It is a metaphysical "conveyance" of the histories underlying forms of bread and wine out

of time and into eternity. There they become parts of the histories which form the substance of our Lord's ascended Body and Blood. This is why we can correctly speak of the Things on the altar after consecration as the Body and Blood of the risen and ascended Christ. His (human) "substance" becomes theirs. They are the holy Things whose histories now incorporate the Life, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension of the Lord, the Coming of the Holy Ghost, and the Church's years of life and service since then.

It will be clear at once that this theory of the conveyance of history-substances into our Lord's eternal Body by the Eucharistic Consecration involves some doctrine of the continual "growth" of that Body. Dr Smyth explicitly confirms this. He says, "This 'growth' of the ascended Body of our Lord is possible for the reason that the latter still remains in the material order of God's creation (since It stems from this creation) even while It now 'sitteth at the right hand of the Father'. The manner of this truly material and corporeal existence within eternity is, perhaps, knowable to human minds only by way of analogy; yet it is St Paul . . . (who speaks) . . . of 'filling-up' the historical content of this very Body" (pp. 48–9; *vide* Col. 1. 24). If we truly regard the Church Militant as our Lord's Body on earth, then there is nothing more natural than to acknowledge that her continuing life provides additional content for our Lord's (one and only) Sacrifice of himself to the Father. This additional content is daily and weekly put forward at the Church's Eucharists, not on the merely human authority of her members but in the power and by the grace of Jesus Christ. We are but our Lord's *agents* in gathering materials for his Offertory. When we bring these materials to the altar they are already, in fact, not "ordinary" bread and wine but substances which have been formed within the ever-growing social Body of the Incarnate Lord. As a preliminary to their Transubstantiation into his Body in its ascended and glorified phase they must first have been en-substantiated into that Body on its earthly and natural level.

Dr Smyth points out that this view of Transubstantiation establishes "a relation of genuine continuity . . . (as in our Lord's individual Resurrection) between the Kingdom of God in this world and the Kingdom of God consummated in eternity. The Thomist definition of Transubstantiation allows merely the *supersession* of the one Kingdom by the other, that is, of the natural bread and wine by the ascended Body and Blood. There is therein no true movement of the one *into* the other. . . . Hence the Thomist doctrine of Transubstantiation disastrously denies a necessary material (i.e. substantially corporeal) continuity between the content of *this* world and the content of the *next*. And this denial has resulted in a presentation of Christianity which elicits only an idealist-moral (rather than a realist-material) interest in the forms of those social, political and economic structures within which and out of which the natural substances of the bread and wine of the Offertory are, by force of the actual situation, prepared—those human social structures which unavoidably contribute their defects and their virtues

(when they are present) to whatever offertorial substances of bread and wine are drawn from them" (pp. 59–60).

To be able to give good liturgical and doctrinal reasons for the existence of "a relation of genuine continuity . . . between the Kingdom of God in this world and the Kingdom of God consummated in eternity" is surely a step toward the integration of a revolutionary social outlook with Christianity. Dr Smyth warns that this is not merely possible but necessary if the present world social revolution is to be saved from the pitfalls of merely humanist "redemption". It is necessary, too, in order to show that while "the goal of presently necessary revolutionary social transformation is indeed fully worth man's every effort" it is so "only because offertorial Victims, redemptively salvaged from a history speeding to its oblivion in fleeting time, can then more abundantly be conveyed in Transubstantiation to find their eternalizing consummation in God, who is the sole life-affirming End of all His creatures" (p. 85).

Dr Smyth therefore ends with a "Call to a Christian Sacrificial Revolution", a new Reformation which at one and the same time reaffirms Eucharistic Transubstantiation and moves to re-establish the Church as the chief agent of world-redemptive social change. It is to this revolution that the Society of the Catholic Commonwealth, of which Dr Smyth is Superior, is dedicated, and it is to his fellow-members of that Society that he dedicates this "Doctrinal Homily".

J. G. Rowe.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE CHURCH IN SOUTH AFRICA

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

As one who has served in the Church of the Province of South Africa for the past thirty years, I feel that I must lodge a protest against the tone of the "South African Letter" in the February number of Theology, especially in the writer's references to the bishops of our church, whose long and careful work on the Revision

of the Prayer Book has met with very general approval throughout the Province.

The Dean of George apparently objects to "the smell of the 1920s" which irritates his sensitive theological nose in some of the revisions. In that theologically dark age, he tells us, before the very recent dawn of Biblical Theology, "Humanism rather than Biblical Revelation determined the doctrine of God"; and under that baleful influence the Bishops removed from the Litany the appeal to God "be not angry with us forever"—a phrase which seems to suggest an ever-angry and almost implacable deity rather than a Heavenly Father. Also, and presumably under the same misguided Humanism, "fear" replaces "dread" in the supplication for "an heart to love and dread (fear) Thee". This really rather perverse and pointless criticism has very little justification even from the point of "Biblical Theology". Only once in the Bible, and that in a somewhat rhetorical denunciatory passage in Isaiah ("let him be your fear and let him be your dread"), is the "dread" of God referred to; but the "fear" of God is a biblical commonplace, and much less liable to be misunderstood than "dread", which is fear intensified to the point of terror and shrinking from the object of the dread, a feeling quite incompatible with "love".

The Dean of George also blames "those days" (i.e. "the 1920s") for "the difficulty of justifying the use of the Old Testament in public worship", which induced the bishops to alter the Epistles appointed to be read on Trinity XII and XIII because they were "Christian interpretations of the Old Testament". Few will quarrel with the substitution of 2 Cor. 4. 7–18 for the old Epistle set for Trinity XII, and I cannot think of anyone but the Dean of George who would not be relieved by the substitution of 2 Cor. 5. 17 ff. for Gal. 3. 16 ff., where St Paul's rabbinical exegesis leaves the ordinary reader either bewildered or irritated. Such "Christian interpretations of the Old Testament" may have had their use in St Paul's time. To-day in public worship they are of no value either for instruction or edification.

In the Burial Office, the substitution of Psalm 23 for Psalm 39 is deplored by the Dean as "a piece of sentimentalism". Actually few of the Psalms are at all suitable for Christian burials, but Psalm 23 is much more in place than the somewhat doleful and depressing consolations of Psalm 39.

These alterations seem to me, and I think to most people, to be definite improvements on the older wording and "theology" of our services, and at least to be a hopeful move in the direction of a greater reality in our public worship.

Finally, the Order of Confirmation. Here Dean Synge's criticisms have some justification, though here again his imaginary picture of a Liturgical Committee Meeting of the Bishops, and their ideas about what "would be rather nice", is not exactly in the best of taste. The Confirmation Service may perhaps be accused and convicted of a certain amount of doctrinal "incoherence": but has any part of the Anglican Communion, or indeed of the Church in

general, officially formulated an intelligent and intelligible statement of the precise relationship between infant baptism and confirmation?

Having now lodged my protest, may I conclude by saying that I welcome the "South African Letter", and am in general agreement with much that the writer has said about the conditions and prospects of the Church of the Province of South Africa.

Yours faithfully,
W. H. T. GAHAN.

THE VICARAGE,
PINETOWN,
NATAL.
9 *March* 1955.

PREACHING AS CORPORATE WORSHIP

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Dr Coggan's article is most timely, and stresses a much-needed truth. May I add from experience one or two points:

1. It is unfortunate, if it be a fact, that the sermon at the Eucharist should "tend to be occupied almost exclusively with the theme of Holy Communion itself". If the Communion is truly, as it should be, the normal and principal gathering of the Lord's People on the Lord's Day, the sermon should cover as wide a field as their needs require. The Epistles and Gospels (and Collects) afford opportunity for exposition and application of Holy Scripture: the Creed, Lord's Prayer and Ten Commandments can be expounded then, as well as all sorts of other appropriate topics. These may often be linked with the words and actions of the liturgy, but it is a mistake to use the occasion for none but sacramental teaching. The time at the preacher's disposal is short, but by careful preparation something worth while *can* be said in ten minutes.

2. Preaching at the Sacrament to a congregation to whom one is shortly to administer Communion is a far more "corporate act of worship" than any other occasion of preaching—whether at a non-communicating Choral Eucharist or after Morning or Evening Prayer. The congregation are "with" the preacher far more closely and intimately than at any other time. He can therefore start much nearer to them, and this saves much preliminary making of contact.

3. The sermon at the Eucharist gains by being placed early in the scheme of worship. When we do preach, as by custom most of us frequently do, after Morning or Evening Prayer, there is much to be said for Archbishop Temple's suggestion of preaching the sermon (in any case unrubrical) after the Third Collect and hymn, and following it with a (carefully chosen) hymn and the prayers. The sermon is thus knit much more closely into the total act of worship. Alternatively, let us not forget that the Prayer Book place for the instruction at Evensong is after the Second Lesson, where it will be followed by the remainder of the Office. Is this ever done nowadays?

Yours faithfully,
HENRY, KNARESBOROUGH.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

In connexion with Dr Coggan's article in your March number your readers may like to have before them a translation of the following extracts from an article entitled "La Prédication est Mystère" by René Girault, Directeur du Grand Séminaire de Poitiers, which appeared in *La Maison Dieu*, No. 29, 1954 (Editions du Cerf, Paris).

"After studying preaching at its highest level . . . let us consider it in its most privileged expression, in its liturgical context.

"Whoever would like to fathom the degree of disfavour into which preaching in the course of the liturgy has fallen, should try the following test: let him inquire at random from churchgoers, even from the clergy, what they consider as the element of improvisation left to the celebrant during a solemn celebration. They will answer that indeed all the details have been irrevocably fixed by the rubrics. Very few will be aware that the fifteen minutes' sermon, if worthy of its name, is an essential part of the liturgy, perfectly integrated in its whole structure, and it gives the celebrant the opportunity of improvising, as he chooses, the words which will fill a quarter of the service. . . .

"Indeed the liturgical celebration has a traditional structure, as duly acknowledged by all scholars. In it, of necessity, you will find the proclamation of the Word of God, the singing of the Assembly, its Prayer and the celebrant's Prayer. Now the Word of God means not only some passages of the Scriptures, but also the homily which follows it, given by a qualified preacher. In the liturgy the Christian Assembly is summoned as a whole, in order that it may become conscious of Christ living in it, to hear the Word, to sing God's wonders, to share in the Holy Mysteries celebrated by the priest as delegated by Christ, and to feed on the Eucharist. The priest is both minister of the Sacrament and minister of the Word. Originally he improvised the whole service; the stabilization of the liturgy and of the readings has left untouched the preacher's freedom.

"It is notable that the place of the sermon has been definitely fixed after the Gospel only at a recent date, and one would surprise many people in telling them that, at the end of the Middle Ages, especially in France and in England, the sermon was sometimes given after the *Orate Fratres*, a custom which lasted in France until the eighteenth century (Jungmann, *Missarum Solemnia*).

"Thus in the liturgy we find a fresh instance of catholic equilibrium between the divine and human elements of the service. One could speak of the intimate union and complementary fusion of the *institution* and of the *event*, to use Pastor Leuba's expression (*L'Institution et l'évènement*, 1950)."

Yours faithfully,

JOHN PERRET.

CASSINGTON,
OXFORD.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By A. A. McArthur. S.C.M. Press 15s.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP. By B. Steuart. Longmans. 30s.

LITURGIE COMPARÉE. By A. Baumstark. Éditions de Chevetogne. 165 Belgian Frs.

THE LITURGICAL MOVEMENT. By J. H. Srawley. Mowbrays. 4s.

There is hope that the stimulating writings in the liturgical field of the late Dr Dix will attract the skilled in languages and historical science to labour on the themes of Christian worship, albeit with less prejudice and all too often mistaken intuition and with greater and more patient wrestling with the facts. Dr A. A. McArthur is a welcome addition to the small company of British scholars producing work in this field, particularly as a member of the Church of Scotland which is displaying so notable a new zest for the subject. It was John Dowden, a Scot of the Episcopal Communion, who in 1910 produced the last general book on McArthur's special theme, *The Church Year and Kalendar*, and a good deal has happened since then making possible a fuller and more accurate writing on these matters. Dr McArthur is occupied chiefly with the developments up to the end of the fourth century, with some reference to what occurred in the next four centuries. He believes in a golden age and subsequent complexity and corruption. He is acquainted with much of the writing on the subject, but he suffers from an incapacity to sit at the feet of the continentals and receive what they have to give before criticizing them. He deliberately avoids or is unaware of not a little that needs noticing in a book to-day on the Christian year. Like Dom B. Botte, he does useful work in correcting a number of airy-fairy judgments and speculations of Dix, but like Dix his own judgment is not sober and sound, but daring and eccentric. It is most extraordinary that in dealing with the origins of the Epiphany he does not even mention Lietzmann (*A History of the Early Church*, Vol. III. From Constantine to Julian. Lutterworth Press, 1950, pp. 314–22). Many will hold that his own suggestions are worth little in comparison with this careful work. The business of trying to trace a feast of the Epiphany back to the days of the Fourth Gospel is intensely speculative, to put it kindly, and a suspicion awakes that the animus is to find authority from the apostolic age for introducing into Scotland the feast of the Epiphany as the commemoration of our Lord's baptism. It is tiresome to speak of the Epiphany as a "unitive" feast and to treat it as in the same category as the pre-Nicene Pasch, almost as tiresome as the medieval lumping of marriage and communion together under the heading "Sacrament". It is highly desirable that we should have a feast of the Baptism and we owe Dr McArthur not a little for his forcible pressing of this. American anglicans already have it on Epiphany II. Sarum had it on the octave of the Epiphany, i.e. both then have a

record of the baptism of our Lord as the Gospel lection. It is possible there is insufficient Scripture on the themes of our Lord's nativity to last twelve days, without resorting to clever typologizings. That would be an argument for making the twelve days of Christtide commemorate not his stay at Bethlehem but all the hidden years until his manifesting to Israel, i.e. abandon Western for Eastern custom.

P. 18. Pliny does not provide evidence for the Christian liturgical use of the Decalogue.

P. 24. The Didascalia makes Wednesday the day of our Lord's arrest, not of Judas' visit to the priests.

P. 29. Daily Communion cannot really be discredited in this way.

P. 70. On Advent. This needs supplementing now by A. Chavasse's article "L'Avent Romain du VIe au VIIIe siècle," Eph. Lit. 1853, pp. 297–308. Also pp .297–308. Also Q. L. and P., p. 277.

P. 8. The attempt to date Egeria's visit to Jerusalem at 417 by Dekkers has been challenged by J. G. Davies (*Vig. Christ.*, vol. X, 1954, pp. 93–100) by an argument which also challenges McArthur's 383 or 388, who however on p. 19 still uses Duchesne's 393–396.

This work is very well worth the research degree awarded it at Aberdeen. May its author maintain his interest in the subject, and in ten to fifteen years' time produce a revised edition, which can become a standard work of reference. It has not quite the caution, exactitude, and comprehensiveness, for that in its present form.

Dom Steuart relies in his *Development of Christian Worship* much, too much, on Dix, and very rightly on Srawley's *The Early History of the Liturgy*. Jungmann's *Missarum Solemnia* appeared too late to be drawn on; indeed Steuart's work can be regarded as a profitable preface for the inexperienced before tackling the greatness of Jungmann. Steuart's *Development* aims at providing for the Roman religious novice and other co-religionists of his who wish to begin a study of the Roman liturgy a survey and condensation of the work of the scholars handling the very manuscripts and documents on which our knowledge of the past depends. It is not a great work but a useful book. It repeats some old hypotheses no longer repeatable as though they were established facts. But he endeavours to sift the gold from the dross, and is on guard against the love of the striking and the bizarre outdoing the love of truth. There are nine chapters on the Mass, one on the office with something of his own to say about the fusion of secular and monastic services in the Byzantine rite. A final chapter reviews the liturgical year, and six appendices contain some interesting texts and discussion.

Baumstark died in 1948. B. Botte has written as preface to a third edition (1953) of *Liturgie Comparée* (1st ed. 1939) a critique of Baumstark as liturgist. He has also verified and completed references, and added to the bibliography in the course of the text and in the appendix. Thus a most valuable feature of the original work has put on weight.

Dr Srawley's is a little book of 34 pages, Alcuin club Tract XXVII, 1954. It is a lecture revised and is about the new stress on intelligibility and corporate participation in the sacrifice and communion of the Eucharist within the Roman community during the last fifty

years, promoted by Giuseppe Sarto as Pius X, 1903–1914, and in the propagation of which the Benedictines of Mont César and Maria Laach have played so large a part. It is written with the clarity and accuracy deservedly associated with the name of J. H. Srawley, who was able to have sympathy and charity for Roman Christianity without for a moment abandoning a critical cousinship for a hypnotic filiality. On p. 29 it might be added that Rousseau's *Histoire du mouvement liturgique*, 1945, has now been translated into American.

ROBERT P. SYMONDS.

LINCOLN.

ART AND THE REFORMATION. By G. G. Coulton. Cambridge University Press. 50s.

It was Voltaire's opinion that there was a complete break in civilization between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Italian artists of the early Renaissance. The subsequent reaction, to the fantasies of the Romantic Revival, now appears equally excessive, from its knights-at-arms palely loitering or pursuing the Grail in a world of pious chivalry that never existed, to the pseudo-monasticism of the Jovial Monk and Ale-jug school of painting and the pre-Raphaelitish odour of late Victorian Anglo-Catholicism; every village church was mauled with the modish crockets and marble knobs and shafts of rediscovered Gothick, on the assumption (shared even by Dr Coulton) that after 1280 "decadence in art set in". From such tendentious extremes Coulton, in company with Professor W. R. Lethaby and followed by such scholars as F. E. Howard and John Harvey, turned towards a more balanced view of the Middle Ages and their artistic achievement. *Art and the Reformation*, a work of social history rather than of art criticism, originally appeared in 1928, and having found its place in every apposite bibliography has now been taken over by the press of its author's old university and re-issued in this corrected edition; a generous, wide-margined volume, copiously illustrated and of permanent value. Its reappearance enables us the better to judge its contribution to the development of the subject since.

Several extraordinary former assumptions about the great churches of the Middle Ages collapse on closer investigation. It is still widely supposed, for instance, that the cathedrals were designed and built by monks and that the Church was responsible for nearly all the arts of the time. Says Montalembert: "They chanted psalms as they worked and laid down their tools only to go to the altar or the choir. . . . While simple monks were often the chief architects of these buildings, abbots gladly condescended to play the part of common workmen." Such a picture is certainly untrue. Anything comparable to the building of Buckfast Abbey would have been exceedingly rare in the Middle Ages, and even there, according to Coulton, never more than six *monks* and generally only five were at work. He goes further and shows that hired lay-men were in fact responsible not only for architecture but also for carving and paint-

ing and metalwork, illumination of manuscripts and even the copying of books. The monastic copyist, contrary to popular belief, was apparently an exception. Probably only a minority of the monks had any real vocation even to the religious life itself, while art was in practice almost deliberately excluded from the Cistercian and Carthusian rules and had no essential place in any others. Indeed the great medieval theologians and moralists incline to speak very slightingly of craftsmanship. St Antonio of Florence, as late as the fifteenth century, like the mystic Hugh of St Victor of the twelfth century, call the "mechanical" arts adulterine (Latin *moechor,* to commit adultery), "for in them man's intellect is as it were adulterated, since it is created principally for the understanding of spiritual things". Numbers of relatively unskilled labourers had, for some of the finest medieval buildings, to be procured by the press-gang, and Coulton's analysis of the extensive accounts fortunately still existing for the building of the chapels of Eton and King's College, Cambridge, is as interesting as illuminating—since a deal of trouble was had with this impressed labour. The guild and apprenticeship system, and the place of freemasonry, he also revealingly explores, and the life of the medieval craftsman in relation to his environment comes out of it vividly enough without any romantic departure from the factual.

One after another the popular fallacies about the Middle Ages are called in question. The limits of the value of the great churches and their embellishments as the Poor Man's Bible are set by the realization that at no time was a large part of medieval symbolism generally understood, even by the clergy, that "not one poor Englishman in a score had ever set eyes upon a cathedral in the Middle Ages, and that there was far less unity of faith then than is commonly represented. . . . It is not only paradoxical but anachronistic to suppose that pictorial art was ever more valuable for religious teaching than the written or spoken word". Yet how often still we are offered a much more highly coloured view, as, say, by Mr Robert Sencourt, who sees the cathedrals as "a new expression of corporate life . . . where plainsong and censer attuned the temper of a multitude to the forms arising in glory from the glooms around them, when ritual lights played upon the embroidered vestments, and at the most solemn moments there were few who did not believe that heaven had opened to their eyes" (*The Consecration of Genius,* 1947). Coulton indulges in no such fervour, but, fully documented and firmly down to earth, reveals how such saintly clerics as Hugh of Lincoln did not hesitate to carry on disputations on the way to the altar or to do business during Mass, and that at Strassburg the Burgomaster's accustomed place for business affairs was his pew at Mass in the cathedral; while the not irreligious Henry II could scarcely refrain (reports Giraldus) from discussing affairs of state with his councillors during the Consecration.

Coulton is not, of course, writing down the Middle Ages or indulging in that merely negative, desiccating criticism typical of the 'twenties, when the book grew out of its author's Lowell Lectures

at Boston in the United States. The period had, after all, too widely come to be regarded as a golden age of spirituality and Christian faith, when an undivided Christendom paid ready allegiance to Mother Rome (a notion naturally agreeable to papists—who regularly repeat it); whereas it is here pointed out that the loveliest cathedrals were in fact produced against a background of strong popular and philosophic doubt and that the pagan gods seemed then as truly existent as the Trinity or the Virgin Mary. Latterly the tendency has been to regard the Renaissance itself as no such marked cleavage as was formerly believed and to see a continuous religious aspiration towards a rebirth of man preparing the way for it throughout the Middle Ages and playing a vital part in achieving that liberated *Weltanschauung*. However, it would be hazardous to press too far Coulton's tendency to reinterpret the medieval ethos in terms of twentieth-century common-sense. The work of Johan Huizinga (cf. *The Autumn of the Middle Age*) and Lucien Febvre and their school, on the evolution of sensibility, reveals the essentially different emotional patterns of such an epoch, its violent ambivalency of feeling and the sharp interactions of people then upon each other; together with the parallel intensities of religious sentiment. The forms of art and aesthetic sensibility could not fail to be affected by such a climate.

Dr Coulton was scarcely an art historian and his own aesthetic opinions are of no great consequence. A Ruskinian adulation of thirteenth-century architecture, with slighting references to our unique English Perpendicular in terms of "an age of shopwork", lacking in originality, taking the line of least resistance with conventional "shallow patterns which a workman could repeat almost with his eyes shut", seems singularly dated now. Since Mr John Harvey's work we are more inclined to reverse the Victorian judgment and to prefer King's Chapel to Salisbury Cathedral (whose tower and spire are mid-fourteenth century in any case). His recent monumental *English Gothic Architects* has finally disposed of the fanciful picture, which Coulton undermined in the book under review, of monastic architects—amateur craftsmen inspired by burning faith and essentially anonymous—building the great churches. More than 1,300 documented biographies of specific medieval architects before 1550 are now available to us. These master-craftsmen of the building trades were commonly literate and often artists and geometricians of some contemporary distinction, for, as he says, "the Middle Ages in England did not conduce to amateur work". Nevertheless the Church, through some of its more exceptional clerics, did take the vital role of enlightened patron, and that is no small achievement.

Finally Dr Coulton disposes of the contention that the Reformation killed Gothic art—which is obviously untenable seeing that the Renaissance came more than a century before Luther, and in any case Protestantism could scarcely have had this effect in the Latin countries, especially Spain. When Carlstadt took to smashing images and glass at Wittenberg in 1521, Luther came out of hiding

to protest. After Pope Nicholas V (1447–55) painted glass was systematically excluded from Italian churches, and the history of vandalism in Rome itself in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is appalling, doing "more harm to the monuments of imperial, republican, and kingly Rome than the ten centuries of preceding barbarism" (Lanciani). Despite the destructions of some of our English reformers there remains in our churches twice as much medieval stained glass as there is in either Italy or Spain; while eighteenth-century taste cast out quantities of lovely glass of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries from Notre-Dame-de-Paris and Reims and many lesser places on the Continent. This was the hand of the Counter-Reformation, not of Protestantism. The fact is, "The average Catholic dignitary of the seventeenth century had less sympathy with Gothic statuary than high Anglicans like Andrewes and Cosin and Laud."

Art and the Reformation remains both eminently readable and an indispensable source of relevant scholarly information.

John H. L. Waterson.

Stoke D'Abernon.

Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation. By P. K. Jewett. James Clarke and Co. 18s.

This book by the Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Gordon Divinity School, U.S.A., falls into two parts. In the first part (pp. 7–136) the author expounds Brunner's account of God's revelation in Christ. In the second part (pp. 139–85) he offers his own critique of this account.

In his exposition Professor Jewett considers Brunner's account of Revelation in its bearing on History, Faith, Reason, and the Bible. This exposition has many merits. It is based upon a wide and thorough knowledge of Brunner's writings in the original German (but the copious quotations are in English); it connects Brunner with his continental predecessors and contemporaries, some of whom may be unknown to British readers; it takes full account of development and self-contradiction in Brunner's thought; and it contains a valuable analysis of such key-concepts as Contemporaneity, Crisis, Decision, and Paradox.

Professor Jewett's criticisms correspond to his exposition and are mainly three.

1. In estimating the significance of the historical Christ Brunner wishes to avoid both Idealism and Relativism. But he does not solve the problem by asserting in the language of Kirkegaardian dialectic that in Christ the eternal *touched* history without having any *extension* in it.

2. Brunner draws a rigid distinction within religious truth between the realm of I-Thou where God meets man in a personal encounter and the realm of I-It where reason attempts to describe what the encounter has revealed in a non-rational or even irrational (paradoxical) way. This distinction, amounting to a new type of,

dualism, is untenable. Brunner himself cannot maintain it consistently.

3. Because of 1 and 2 i.e. because he persists in rating encounter above both history and description, Brunner cannot accord to Scripture its unique authority.

The present reviewer wholeheartedly endorses these criticisms and believes that Professor Jewett produces enough evidence and argument to justify the following conclusion on page 185. "In the last analysis, then, not only is reason no proper criterion of revealed truth, but there is no criterion whatever. Thus Brunner involves the whole question of religious truth in subjectivism." The I-Thou encounter is self-authenticating and faith, at least in its opening stages, becomes a groundless venture.

The author's reasoning is too close (sometimes even cramped) and his language too technical for his book to serve as an introduction to the subject. Those, however, who are already acquainted with Brunner's thought will be instructed by the exposition and stimulated by the critique. The book certainly makes us doubt whether Brunner recognizes either the complexity or the unity of Christian revelation.

University College,
Bangor.

H. P. Owen.

Interpretatio Mariologica Protoevangelii Posttridentina . . . Pars Posterior. Ab anno 1661 usque ad definitionem dogmaticam Immaculatae Conceptionis (1854). By Tiburtius Gallus, S.J. Apud Edizioni di Storia e Litteratura, Rome. Lire 4,000.

This volume, if less striking and epoch-making than the first, which was reviewed in an article in Theology in March, 1954, is by no means an unworthy sequel.

The two volumes together contain some 580 expositions of the text Gen. 3. 15. Of these no less than 84 are by "Non-Catholics". Among those in Vol. II we find Joannes Lightfoot, and Hieronymus and Matthaeus Polus, each of whom is labelled "Anglicanus". Would that their contributions were less dull! But for that we can blame them, or ourselves, rather than the editor.

The value of this book consists not only in the fact that it is eirenical and enlightened to the full extent allowed by Rome's dogmatic rigidity. This time it is also official. It contains an approving and appreciative letter to the author from the Pope imparting his "Apostolic Blessing".

We may translate a couple of extracts from the final summing up (pp. 332 and 339). "This polemical attitude on the part of Catholics, relying as they did on the exaggerated authority attributed to the Vulgate as also on patristic consent, was almost constant and uniform throughout the whole of the 'Golden age of Catholic exegesis'. This manifestation is to be explained in psychological terms as a consequence of the 'Prestige-problem'. In consequence it became impossible for Reformers to take the right line even in the most minor

or controverted detail, while the contrary assertions of Catholics had all to be shared and upheld with unrelenting vigour. This rigid attitude on the part of Catholics in defending the reading 'ipsa' gave occasion to the Reformers to abuse and vilify the Catholic Church, and filled them with animosity against the cult of the B.V.M." (The reading referred to is that of the Vulgate in Gen. 3. 15) "To-day Catholic interpreters are abandoning the reading 'ipsa' for 'ipse'. In this they agree with non-Catholics. Let the non-Catholics now agree with the Catholics, and admit the mariological sense of the woman divinely endued with enmity towards the serpent. The Protevangelium will thus provide a first step towards unity in the Gospel."

This should indeed cause joy in heaven. Let us for our part refrain from seeing imaginary birdlime on every such olive-branch. Mariology is a keypoint in the doctrine of the relation between nature and grace. What else did Karl Barth call for when he said, "Let the Roman Church work out its doctrine of nature and grace, with the Tridentine teaching on justification, to their logical conclusions . . . not merely in a syllogistic spirit, but as listening to Christ, the Christ of the Scriptures." To take that path is to advance, and not to retreat.

COSSLETT QUIN.

NARRAGHMORE RECTORY,
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SHORTER NOTICES

YORKSHIRE UNITED INDEPENDENT COLLEGE. By K. W. Wadsworth. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

The history of a college can be dry as dust, or at least of interest only to its alumni. But this history of the Yorkshire United Independent College, which traces its descent from the Heckmondwike Academy founded in 1756, has been so written as to merit more widespread attention. The development of nonconformist training for the ministry is unfolded from the rise of the dissenting academies, and is closely and skilfully related to social and political, as well as to ecclesiastical and theological, changes of climate. The book is thus a useful contribution to the religious and educational history of England. It has the further advantage of being extremely readable. Our only quarrel with Mr Wadsworth's style is his predilection for the word "commence". His story is enlivened with attractive pen-pictures of many old-time dissenting divines. But it is curious that he should locate the "Holy Club" at *Cambridge* (p. 36).

POEMS IN THE PORCH. By John Betjeman. Illustrated by John Piper. S.P.C.K. 2s.

These verses were written for speaking on the wireless (Western Region). Now published, they should find a welcome in church tract cases.

THE SEPTUAGINT BIBLE. Translated by Charles Thomson. Revised by C. A. Muses. Falcon's Wing Press, Indian Hills, Colorado. $6.50.

Charles Thomson was Secretary of the Continental Congress of the U.S.A. from 1774 to 1789. His translation into English of the Septuagint was first published in 1808. This new edition, which is in large, clear type, basically follows Thomson's translation, but it has been carefully revised so as to make it more accurate and readable and also easier to use for reference purposes. It does not contain the books of the Apocrypha. Students of the Old Testament who are unable to read Greek will find it serviceable.

A. R. V.

SIMONE WEIL—"Studies in Modern European Literature and Thought". By E. W. F. Tomlin. Bowes and Bowes. 6s.

Mr Tomlin's book on Simone Weil is a little masterpiece. It is not only the best, most level-headed, appraisal of Simone we have seen, but it is a contribution in its own right to that literature which helps us to face the problems of our time. Mr Tomlin might have made a little more of the deeply heretical—Catharist—streak that runs through Simone's thought. But he is not uncritical of some of her attitudes. His plea that she represents a much-needed "scepticism shot through by faith", to balance the more common "faith shot through by scepticism", is a moving one. He writes in a clean, epigrammatic style and with a mature wisdom which often reminds one of another better-known writer—Mr T. S. Eliot. Both those who have so far resisted the fascination of Simone and those who know her works by heart will equally profit from this profound study.

MARTIN JARRETT-KERR, C.R.

AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELIGION. By E. G. Parrinder. Hutchinson's Universal Library. 8s. 6d.

Dr Parrinder has written a scholarly, sober, and reliable study. Where he cannot speak with certainty he says so; where erroneous views need dismissal he is emphatic. He is charitable and courteous, avoiding equally patronage and scorn of primitive beliefs. He has been obliged to be brief, and in consequence he is sometimes dull, cataloguing the beliefs found in various parts of Africa through lack of space to interpret them. But this cannot be held against him. As an introduction to the subject, either for those who want a smattering of knowledge or for those who desire to pursue the study, it is quite admirable.

For those whose notions are derived from Rider Haggard, one quotation may be made. "The term 'witch-doctor' is one of the most abused in European writing about African beliefs. Frequently regarded even by legislators as a witch, an evil man seeking to poison his neighbours, or a perverted priest, the witch-doctor is really none

of these things. He is a fully recognized and highly respected member of society. His function is not to harm, but to heal."

F. C. SYNGE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

AUGUSTINE PRESS: Walton Hannah, *Why shouldn't I be a Freemason?* (9d.).

BEREAN PRESS: E. G. Rupp, *Prophetic Preaching* [Joseph Smith Memorial Lecture] (2s.).

BLACKFRIARS PUBLICATIONS: Henry St John, O.P., *Essays in Christian Unity* (12s. 6d.).

GEOFFREY BLES: Nathaniel Micklem, *Ultimate Questions* (7s. 6d.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: A. H. N. Green-Armytage, *Portrait of Saint Luke* (12s. 6d.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: C. S. Lewis, *De Descriptione Temporum* (2s. 6d.).

CAREY KINGSGATE PRESS: L. H. Marshall, *Rivals of the Christian Faith* 12s. 6d.).

COLLINS: Hugh Ross Williamson, *The Great Prayer* (12s. 6d.).

DENT: W. E. Orchard, *Sancta Sanctorum—Prayers for the Holy of Holies* (12s. 6d.).

DOUBLEDAY (NEW YORK): W. J. Wolf, *Man's Knowledge of God* ($2.95).

EDINBURGH HOUSE PRESS: Olive Wyon, *Praying for Unity* (1s.).

FABER AND FABER: Josef Pieper, *Fortitude and Temperance* (10s. 6d.).

HODDER AND STOUGHTON: Frank Colquhoun, *Harringay Story* (10s. 6d.); John L. Casteel, *Rediscovering Prayer* (12s. 6d.); Cyril Garbett, Archbishop of York, *World Problems of To-day* (4s. 6d.); Ernest White, *Christian Life and the Unconscious* (10s. 6d.).

INDEPENDENT PRESS: William J. Shergold, *A Devotional Commentary on the Shorter Oxford Bible* (12s. 6d.); J. W. Ashley Smith, *The Birth of Modern Education* (19s. 6d.).

LONGMANS: "A Friend of God," *The Book of the Poor in Spirit* (21s.; pocket edition, 8s. 6d.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: Charles E. Raven, *Christianity and Science* (2s.).

MOWBRAYS: Brother Bernard, *The Threefold Gift of Christ* (2s. 6d.); St Bonaventure, *The Mystical Vine* (3s. 6d.); William of St Thierry, *On Contemplating God* (2s. 6d.); H. C. Puech, etc., *The Jung Codex* (15s.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: *Ordinal and Service Book—For use in Courts of the Church* (8s. 6d.); Thomas Gilby, *St Thomas Aquinas—Theological Texts* (15s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: H. A. Hodges, *Anglicanism and Orthodoxy* (3s.); Friedrich Gogarten, *Demythologizing and History* (7s. 6d.); G. A. F. Knight, *Esther, Song of Songs, Lamentations* (7s. 6d.).

SHEED AND WARD: Ronald Knox, *A Retreat for Lay People* (12s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Joyce Kenwrick, *The Religious Quest* (15s. 6d.); *After This Manner—Devotions from the Holy Bible and the Book of Common Prayer after the Manner of the Lord's Prayer* (12s. 6d.); *Religious Education in Schools* 8s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K. (FOR THE CHURCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY): Alan Savidge, *The Foundation and Early Years of Queen Anne's Bounty* (15s.).

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